This paper estimates the effect of an administrative change in a voucher policy implemented by an Italian Regional government. The voucher has been installed in 2000, and is intended to help families that want enroll their children in private schools. In 2008/09, the policy has been changed, facilitating the administrative procedure for obtaining the voucher, and integrating additional financial aid. The effect of this change is estimated by a panel econometric analysis that compares the proportion of first-year students enrolled in private schools with that of other Regions, controlling for some demand and supply-driven factors that affect families' propensity to choose private schooling. The policy modification did not affect the proportion of students who enroll to private schools, across all the three (primary, junior and upper secondary) educational levels.
1. Introduction: motivation and research question Private schooling provision is not a massive phenomenon in the Italian educational system: according to OECD, the proportion of students in private schools in 2012 was well below the average of OECD countries (indeed, almost half of it) and well lower of the one observed in the other four big European economies (France, Germany, Spain, United Kingdom) -see Table 1 .
[ Table 1 ] around here One exception to this general picture is represented by one Region, Lombardy, where a series of factors contribute to determine a higher proportion of enrolments in the private educational segment: a more diffuse proportion of religious families (most part of private schools are somehow religiously affiliated), an average high-quality of private schools (see the OECD statistics about the differences in achievement scores between public and private schools across different regions), and a larger number of private schools available, given a long tradition in this stream. The Regional Government launched a voucher program in 2000 /2001 , with the aim of encouraging the enrolment rate in private schools. In its first application, the voucher covered around 25% of the school fees (to a limit of 1,250€/child per annum), and was subjected to a means test, even if it was not stringent. Indeed, administrative data show that the voucher has been assigned to more than 60% of students attending a private school (source: Lombardy Regional Government), so it was a massive financial support involving the majority of families who opted for private. In 2008/09, the policy has been modified; in particular financial support was also extended to (poorer) students going to public schools to cover part of their educational expenses for supplies (no fees are charged in public schools). According to , the average amount of voucher did not change substantially between 2007/08 (last year of the 'old' voucher system) and the two subsequent years, for students in private schools 1 . At the same time, however, a major change in the intervention was related to a substantial simplification of the administrative procedures to be undertaken when applying for the voucher. All the details about the reform are in , as well as in section §2. The aim of this paper is to answer the following research question: did the change in the voucher policy affect the proportion of first-year students who enrolled into private schools, in Lombardy? The importance of private school enrolments -and more in general of competition between private and public schools -has made clear by Couch et al. (1993, p. 309) : "educational achievement in the public schools is higher in those counties where a larger percentage of school-age children are enrolled in private schools" (see also the various empirical evidences and discussions in Hoxby, 2007) . 2 For exploring this topic, we conduct an analysis of the demand and supply-driven factors that are statistically associated with the proportion of (first-year) students enrolled into private schools at Province level, before and after the year in which the voucher policy changed in Lombardy (2008/09) and we check whether, among the 100 Italian Provinces 3 , the 11 ones located in Lombardy show a different pattern -in absolute terms and over time. We also use an alternative identification strategy to control for a potential neighborhood influence in school choice policies (Rincke, 2006) . The choice of limiting to the first-year students is because this indicator measures the "flux" of families opting for private schooling, while the proportion of all students in private schools represents a "stock" influenced by past decisions, which are likely to be not affected by current policy. The policy shock did not affect the proportion of students enrolled to private schools, across all the three (primary, junior and upper secondary) educational levels. The paper is organized as follows. The next section §2 describes the background of the paper: private schooling in Italy, the details of the voucher policy, and some previous literature. Section §3 illustrates the methodology and dataset, while the section §4 contains the results. Section §5 concludes.
Background

The private school sector in Italy: an overview
In Italy, education is run by State schools (93% of the total), and non-State (private) schools, called "paritarie" (i.e. "having the same legal status") -hereafter, we refer to these simply as private schools. The dual system of State and private schools has always been a typical feature of the Italian school system. Private schools, which were usually founded and managed by holy orders (especially Catholic Church) in the past, were mainly chosen by families who wished to have wider school pathways and longer school days for their children (private institutions often offer educational activities in the afternoon), as well as a safe and stimulating school environment, and a clear educational orientation favorable (or at least not hostile) to religious faith. However, over the years the situation has changed, because also in the State institutions more and more families were looking for enhanced and wider educational pathways. In 2000, in order to give an organic arrangement to the wide panorama of non-State schoolswhich in the meanwhile had been developing in different organizational settings -the Parliament approved the Law n. 62/2000 ("Regulations about school equality and instructions on the right to study"). The purpose of the law is to enrich the educational offer, by explicitly recognizing the equal value of public and private schools. Specifically, private schools were entitled to issue certificates with the same legal value as State schools; since 2000, then, these private schools were finally called "paritarie". In order to be fully accredited and become an integrating part of the national education system, private schools have to meet the same requirements and rules adopted by State schools (especially, about the average and medium sizes of classes, general teaching programs, etc.) 4 .
The afore mentioned Law n. 62/2000 about school equality established the following principles for all levels:
• private schools and schools run by local authorities (municipalities and provinces) are recognized as "paritarie" schools, upon request and provided the following conditions: (i) they offer an educational pathway according to the Constitution and to the current regulations and provisions; (ii) admission is open to everybody who accepts the school educational offer, including disadvantaged pupils or pupils with special needs; (iii) schools have a budget (and a Financial Report) which has to be made public; (iv) rooms, furnishings and equipment are adequate -according to standards set by the Ministry; (v) their governing bodies are based on a democratic representation; (vi) members of the teaching staff have the required professional qualifications and requirements and the staff is hired according to the labor national contracts; (vii) schools provide complete courses and grades (i.e. they are not afforded to have partial grades such as only the first two -out of five -classes of primary or secondary educational level); (viii) schools adhere to the national assessment system according to the standards established for State schools.
• "Paritarie" private schools are enabled to issue certificates with the same legal value as State schools of the same school level; they are free to choose their cultural orientation and their educational-didactical approach.
• Non profit-making schools benefit from special tax concessions, in accordance with constitutional norms; moreover, special funds can be allocated by the State for implementing a student support system for disadvantaged families.
• "Paritarie" non State schools, offering a public service, have therefore to accept registrations from any applicants -obviously, those who approve their learning pathway and academic orientation. The main difference between public and private schools is that while the former are paid by general taxation, the latter are funded by fees paid by the families. This characteristic is the main (economic) explanation for the low number of students enrolled in private schools (also, it explains why the proportion of students in private schools is higher in the Northern Italy, where GDP per capita is substantially higher than in the South). Thus, while "paritarie" private schools are legally equally to public ones, they are not economically -as they are not funded by the State, and are not free-of-charge for all families, as instead are public ones. In table 2, we report the number -and the proportion -of first-year students enrolled in public and private schools, in all the Italian Provinces, in the last year considered in the analysis in this paper (2012/13). Looking at the table, it is clear the level of heterogeneity with some Provinces where the share of students enrolled in private institutions is particularly high (>12%) and others where there are no students in private schooling.
[ Table 2 ] around here called "schools" and they are not entitled to fulfil the right/duty to education. However, the number of such schools is negligible, and we do not include them into the analysis.
As for further descriptive aims, we report the evolution of first-year students in private schools in the period under scrutiny (between 2004/05 and 2012/13), focusing on the Lombardy Region (the one to which the paper refers to), compared with the other 5 Regions in the Northern Italy (Emilia-Romagna, Friuli Venezia-Giulia, Liguria, Piedmont, Veneto), and the national average (Figure 1 ). It can be noted that, with the only exception of primary schooling, Lombardy is the Region with the highest proportion of students enrolled in private schools. Moreover, although the evolution over time is quite flat in all the regions, some patterns can be detected, such as a general decline tendency (it is worth to remember that since 2009 the financial crisis also invested Italy).
[ Figure 1 ] around here
The voucher policy in the Lombardy Region (2000/01) and its change in 2008/09
The government of the Lombardy Region implemented the voucher policy in 2000/01 (called "Buono Scuola"), with the aim of stimulating families to enroll their children to private schools. The political rationale behind the launching of such policy was twofold. First, in Italy public authorities are not allowed to fund private schools directly; indeed, a constitutional norm (article 33) states that private schools can be established, but without receiving public funding. As a consequence, the government of Lombardy Region, which was positively oriented towards private schooling, saw the voucher as a viable instrument for financially supporting private schools without violating the constitutional norm. Second, the regional government intended to raise the public debate about the substantial parity of private and public schools; it argued that less affluent families where actually not free to choose their desired schools, because of (unequal) financial constraints. Some specific features characterized the voucher scheme. The voucher could be requested only ex-post, as a reimbursement. In other terms, the family applies for a payment that can cover some of the expenses (typically, school fees) that have been already paid by the family in the past school year. The reimbursement had the form of a cash payment, and the public officers cannot control if the money has been spent for educational purposes. The criteria for obtaining the voucher was means-tested. If a family's indicator of income is lower than about 46,000€ in the reference year, the voucher covers 25% of the documented expenses, for a maximum of 1,250€. For disadvantaged families (income <8,500€), the voucher covered 50% of the expenses (but again with the limit of 1,250€). Some descriptive data reported by indicate that the average contribution received by families was around €700 per child in the last year of the policy (2007/08). In addition to the voucher, disadvantaged families can have access to a grant that is completely means-tested ("borse di studio"), and can be obtained by students in either public or private schools 5 . However, for the latter a different administrative process was required to apply for the grant. The amount of the grant was very limited (on average, € 150) because mainly students from public schools requested it, and they have only small amounts of expenditures to cover (such as transportation, meals at school, etc.). Many families whose students were in private schoolsdid even not know about the possibility of this grant, and the necessity of filling a different administrative paperwork from that of voucher discouraged them to apply. In the last year in which the policy was operating (2007/08), the main numbers of the voucher policy were: around 64,000 students obtained it (around 60% of all students enrolled in the private sector in the Region), and they received on average a voucher of € 703 (for a total regional expenditure higher than € 45 millions). Albeit microdata on single students are not available, it can be estimated that few thousands of these students also obtained the grant. In 2008/09, the policy has been substantially amended, after a diagnosis that identified three main problems: (i) an excessive fragmentation of the instruments (voucher and grant, with two different administrative processes), (ii) the ex-post functioning of the process, that de facto prevented families with financial constraints to enrol their children to private schools, and (iii) the use of cash transfers instead of pure vouchers, that can lead to a misuse of the resources, i.e. different from educational purposes. The new policy scheme (called "Dote Scuola") has three main characteristics:
• An unique administrative process, through which the family can ask the voucher and, if in a situation of financial disadvantage, an additional grant (the amount of which is predetermined and raised, equal to 120€, 220€ and 320€ for primary, middle and high school students, respectively).
• The application for the voucher has been anticipated at the beginning of the scholastic year (families should apply in January for the school year starting in September). Also, the contribution is received before the year starts.
• Lastly, the money flow directly to the schools -not passing in the hands of families as cash -so they are surely used only for a discount on the school fee. Also the families who obtain the grant do not receive money, but spending vouchers that can be used in accredited shops for buying educational supplies. Overall, the changes were promoted to make the policy more in line with its first aim, that is to provide an incentive to the families who are considering the option of private schools to have a support for it. In next sections, we first review some evidence about the characteristics of families that choose private schools (section §2.3) and then implement a methodology to assess if the proportion of families who chose private schools after the implementation of the policy change did modify in Lombardy (section §3).
Why do families choose private schools? Evidence from previous literature
Some literature in the fields of educational economics and educational science explored the factors behind families' choice of private schooling. In general terms, three groups of variables have been identified: (i) preferences toward private schooling (i.e. religious affiliation, adherence to specific teaching methodologies, etc.), (ii) economic determinants (presence of financial constraints), and (iii) availability of private schools, possibly of various kinds. In this section, we discuss some previous contributions that have influenced the formulation of our research questions, as well as the modeling of our empirical setting. Long & Toma (1988) analyzed the data from the US Census of Population, years 1970 and 1980 , with the aim of investigating the determinants of private school attendance. Their results highlighted that supply factors matter: for instance, the density of private schools in an area stimulates local private school enrolment. Also, socioeconomic characteristics of families have a role, in that richer families have higher propensity to enroll their kids to private schools. The "income effect" is the most substantial, together with racial differences (white families are more likely to go private than non-white counterparts). The coefficient of income is larger in 1970 than in 1980, and slightly larger for secondary than primary schooling, probably due to higher fees for secondary private schools. Buddin et al. (1998) studied the profile of families who chose private schools in California in 1990, and stated that: "(…) the propensity of families to choose private schooling rises with family income for both elementary and high school students" (p. 123). Income has been identified as not the solely variable that plays a role. For instance, if public school test scores are lower, more families go private, all else equal. These findings are confirmed through an international comparison provided by Rutkowsky et al. (2012) , who also explored if there is a higher propensity for high-achievers to select private schools. No evidence has been found about this. Indeed, the authors employed data from PISA 2006 and conclude that: "(…) SES, rather than achievement or attitude, is the strongest, most consistent international predictor of attending a school managed or funded by private sector. Given our findings, it does not appear that private schools are skimming off the highest achieving students, but rather, they are skimming off the most affluent students" (p. 387). In the US context, also ethnicity is a good predictor of families' choices. For instance, analyzing the choices of families who enrolled their children to charter schools in Texas, Weiher & Tedin (2002) analyze the choices of families who drop their children from public schools, and enroll them to a charter one: they show that racial composition of student body is more homogeneous in charter schools of choice than in previous public schools. When considering the Italian case, some previous contributions argue that private schools are of lower quality than their public counterparts. Bertola et al. (2007) analyze three cohorts of secondary school graduates, and find that Italian private schools attract children from more affluent families, but with lower levels of academic talents. This evidence is coherent with other studies that consider the role of private education in Italy as "remedial", in the sense of being targeted to students who do not succeed in public schools (see, for instance, Brunello & Checchi, 2005) . Nevertheless, OECD data (from various PISA editions) demonstrates that there is a lot of heterogeneity in the relative quality of private schools, with their average test scores being higher than those of public schools in many Regions, including Lombardy. Thus, any conclusive statement about the relative performance of public and private schools in Italy is difficult to accomplish at this stage. Also in the Italian case, all the existent evidence suggests that students in private schools have a better socioeconomic background. In this paper, we assume that also policy initiatives can be included among the various factors that affect families' choices toward private schools. This idea is supported by previous literature. For example, Downes & Schoeman (1998) argued that the rapid growth in the private school sector followed the implementation of reforms in response to the Supreme Court decisions about Serrano cases: the reforms implied to equalize the per pupil funding of public schools, and this lead some families to decide enrolment of their children to private schools that have higher level of resources available for instructional activities. In her theoretical analyses and simulations, Ferreyra (2007) 2012/13 (2012) . We split the analysis by the three educational levels: primary, middle and high schooling -under the idea that the determinants of choice can be somehow different. The choice of variables has been influenced by the extant literature about the factors that influence parents when deciding for public or private schools (see section §2.3). Our dependent variable is the percentage of all first-year students who enroll to a private school at Province level (% enrolled). For each of the three models we use (one for each educational level), the independent variables are:
i. the percentage of foreign first-year students at Province level (% immig). This indicator controls for the lower propensity of immigrant families to send their children to private schools (albeit, it must be kept in mind that immigrant families concentrate in the North, where the propensity of enrolling students in private schools is higher); ii.
the teachers/students ratio in primary, junior and upper secondary public schools at Province level (stratio). Controlling for this variables is important if we believe that the quality of public schools does influence the demand for private schooling in a certain area (Couch et al., 1993) ; iii.
three indicators of the wealth and general socioeconomic condition of the geographical area in which schools operate: the unemployment rate at Province level (unemp), the female employment rate at Province level (fem_emp), the GDP per capita (in 1,000€). Previous theoretical models of school choice, indeed, highlight that families' socioeconomic background -and especially income wealth -would be positively correlated with the choice of private schooling (Cohen-Zada & Justman, 2003) . Thus, the proportion of students in private schools should be higher in Provinces where the average wealth of families is higher. All the empirical elaborations include a series of year dummies (reference period: 2004-2012) , with the aim of controlling for potential structural differences across years in the enrolment rate to private schools. While all of these variables are related to demand factors, in a second set of empirical estimations, we also included a variable that represents an important supply-side characteristic, namely the number of private schools every 1,000 students in a given Province (dens_privschools). Obviously, this variable is likely to be endogenous with the proportion of students enrolled in private schools, so we interpret the relationships between the two indicators as correlational, and not causal. Data about school variables were extracted from different administrative school registers at the Italian Ministry of Education. These registers are regularly updated directly by the schools: these submitted data are then collected and checked by the Ministry. The first register is the school database, including records that are essentially linked to the characteristics of the school (location, structure of the managing institution, school level, learning pathways, etc.). Through the school 'identifier' (code) we were able to link the school register to a database containing information on students at every school level. They are systematically collected at specific times by the schools and continuously updated over the school year. The variables that measure the various socioeconomic characteristics of the Province (unemployment rate, GDP, etc.) are instead extracted by the dataset of the Italian Institute of Statistics (Regional statistics) and by Eurostat database (sub-data at NUTS-3 level). Tables 3, 4 and 5 contain the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis, for primary, junior secondary and upper secondary educational levels, respectively. Lombardy data are reported also separately, to show the differences from the national average. T-tests are performed to check whether such differences are statistically significant or not. Descriptive statistics are presented for the first (2004/05) and last (2011/12) year of the available panel. In all the three educational levels, the proportion of students enrolled in private schools (%enrolled) in the group of the 18 Regions (100 Provinces) has been stable in the period considered -around 4.7% in primary schools, 2.7% in middle schools, and 2.5% in high schools. The corresponding numbers are not only higher in Lombardy, but also show a (slightly) growing tendency in primary and middle schools (from 6.7% to 7.3% for the former, and from 6.6% to 7.2% in the latter). The same path does not hold for high schools, where the private enrolment rate is stable in the Region, around 4.7%. The proportion of immigrant students (%immigrants) almost doubles in all regions, in all levels of education, in the eight years considered. The relevance of the phenomenon, in absolute terms, is much marked in Lombardy -where, in primary and middle schooling, more than 15% of students were immigrants in 2011/12. Students:teachers ratio increased over time in all the Regions, given the policies of containing costs in the years under analysis. Turning to the Province-level variables, unemployment rates (unemp) and female employment (fem_emp) both grew in the period when considering the 18 regions. As to Lombardy Region, there is the same tendency for unemp but a slowdown in female employment. Lastly, GDP per capita (GDPpc) was always higher in Lombardy provinces (>30,000 €) than in the remaining part of Italy (<25,000 €), but the growth was slower, though. Lastly, the number of private schools every 1,000 students (dens_privschools) in Italy was substantially stable over time for primary educational level, slightly growing in middle education, and increased in upper-secondary educational level. The absolute value of the indicator is higher for high schools than primary schools. In all educational levels, density of private schools is higher in Lombardy Region than in the remaining part of Italy.
Descriptive statistics
[ Tables 3, 4 and 5] around here
Methods
For each dependent variable, we estimate the following full model:
where !" is the dependent variable %enrolled, the vector !" contains the independent variables listed above (% immig, stratio, unemp, fem_emp, GDPpc, dens_privschools) , Lombardy is a dummy that takes value 1 if the focal Province is in Lombardy (Lombardy) -this latter captures the structural difference in private schooling enrolment between Lombardy and the other Regions, Lombardy* t is a vector of the cross-products between the year dummies and the variable Lombardy -the latter are included to capture whether the time trend in private schooling enrolment has been statistically different in Lombardy. The parameter of interest for measuring the potential effect of the change in voucher policy is ! , More specifically, to test whether the change in the voucher policy in Lombardy affected the proportion of first-year students who enrolled into private schools, we performed a series of Wald tests on: (i) the ( The model above explained is estimated separately by including: i) all the 100 Provinces in the 18 regions; and ii) only the 35 Provinces in Lombardy and in the 3 Regions that are at the border with it (Piedmont, Emilia-Romagna, Veneto), respectively. This latter identification strategy allows us to control for a potential neighborhood influence in school choice policies (Rincke, 2006) , and thus to have a more precise counterfactual.
To estimate our models, we resort to pooled OLS estimates that control for time shocks and panel random-effects (RE) estimators, which assume that the correlation between the province-level component of the model and the independent variables is zero.
Results
We report the baseline results in Tables 6, 7 [ Tables 6, 7 and 8] around here Among the covariates, only GDPpc is statistically significant in all models, indicating that in more wealthy Provinces there is a higher propensity to enroll children in private schools (this finding is coherent with previous studies that highlighted that in most countries wealth is a predictor of propensity to enroll to private schools, see Rutkowski et al. (2012) . This evidence is coherent with the fact that fees at private schools cannot be afforded by all families, but only by the wealthier ones. When concentrating on primary educational level, year dummies reveal that the proportion of first-year students enrolled in private schools increased over time in Italy, but instead decreased when focusing on the four Northern Regions -where the initial level was higher.
When observing results about middle schools, the trend of first-year students' enrolment is decreasing (at a similar rate) both in the larger group of 18 Regions and in the one of the four Northern ones. Lastly, the trend is instead positive -no matter the group of Regions considered -when looking at the proportion of first-year students in private high schools, especially in the last years (from 2009/10 onward). Across all educational levels, the dummy Lombardy is statistically significant and positively related with the dependent variable (%enrolled), confirming that in the Provinces of the Region the proportion of first-year students enrolled in private schools is higher indeed, all else equal. The coefficient ranges between 1.6% (primary school level) and 2.7% (middle schools) when comparing Lombardy with the Northern Regions, and even between 2.2% and It turns out that this is the case indeed, and the magnitude of this effect is 1.6% for primary and middle school level, and even 3% for high school level (the magnitude must be interpreted as a cumulative boost of the enrolment rate to private schools, when compared with 2004/05). Put simply, these findings suggest that after the reform, the proportion of first-year students enrolled in private schools in the Lombardy Provinces grew more than in other Provinces (and more than before in Lombardy), all else equal -that is, controlling for other potential factors that can affect the propensity to enroll to private schools. However, if we control for the pre-reform trend -that is to say, we subtract the coefficients of year*Lombardy before 2008/09 -the coefficients remain positive, but not statistically significant for primary schools. However, the estimated effect when considering the six years span (t-3; t+3) is still significant for middle schools (+1.3%) and high schools (+1.7%). When including dens_privschools among the covariates, it turns out to be highly statistically significant (tables 9, 10 and 11). The explanatory power of the models does increase a lot, as demonstrated by the values of R 2 . The coefficients of other variables do not vary substantively, confirming that this indicator captures an autonomous phenomenon; the magnitude of the indicator for Lombardy somehow reduces, thus. The estimated cumulative effect of the change of private school enrolment after the policy change (compared with 2004/05) remains quite stable also in this set of elaborations, ranging from 1% to 2.4%. In this case, i.e. when considering the diffusion of private schools, it seems that the educational level most affected is primary schooling. Therefore, in these cases the consideration of prereform trends makes the estimates of policy's effects as not statistically relevant; in all cases, the estimate is positive, but very small in magnitude (ranging between 0.46% and 0.78%, data refer to t-3;t+3 time span). A possible explanation is that, in circumstances when the diffusion of private schools is taken into account (supply-related factors), the pre-reform trends are described in a better way and they do not mask apparent changes.
[ Tables 9, 10 and 11] around here Taken together, the results of the empirical analysis do not highlight any effect of the policy modification on the propensity of families to enroll their children to private schools. In Lombardy, the trend of private schooling enrolment (conditioned to demand and supplydriven observable characteristics) is positive, as testified by the positive coefficients of year*Lombardy dummies, but has not been boosted by the reform in 2008/09 -at least, not in a statistically relevant way.
Concluding remarks
The empirical analysis proposed here suggests that the policy instrument, as modified by the Lombardy regional government in 2008/09, was not able to increase the proportion of students who attend private schools in the Region. Private school enrolment was already higher in Lombardy than in the rest of the country (maybe because the role of the voucher policy launched in 2000/01, but we cannot test here this hypothesis), and the policy change determined a cumulated improvement in the period 2009/10-2012/13 of between 0.4% and 0.7% (depending on the educational level) -when compared with the three years before the reform, 2005/06-2007/08 -but this change is not statistically different from zero. However, it is not certain that the objective of the reform was to increase the number of children in private school sector. Indeed, it is likely that the main purpose was to make the process easier for the families who already chose for private schools. In a previous research conducted through phone interviews, Colombo (2012) already pointed out that families in Lombardy appreciate the voucher policy, but do not consider it as essential/crucial for their decisions. The reform in 2008/09 has been implemented at zero cost, and was based on a simplification of bureaucratic and administrative procedures. Thus, any improvement of families' satisfaction should be welcomed as a net (social) welfare gain. In this sense, future research should investigate the opinions of families who benefited from the new policy regime, and not only if the new scheme was able to quantitatively affect families' choices. To conclude, the findings presented in the paper must be interpreted in the light that administrative details -and not only policy strategies -can have practical effects. Indeed they can eventually act together with the policy features to pursue the expected objectives. In this sense, school choice can be favored also by fine-tuning details of procedures within existent 'choice programs', and this is somehow the case for the voucher of the Lombardy Region. The proportion of students in private schools reported by OECD is slightly (sometimes substantially) higher than that resulting from data by the Ministry of Education (the latter are those used for this research). Therefore, the numbers reported here cannot be straightforwardly confronted with those used in the paper, which come from the Ministry of Education, because of three main reasons:
• in this paper, we do not include also the "pure private" schools, which instead are counted by OECD.
• we do not have private schools from Autonomous Provinces and Regions in our dataset (i.e. Aosta, Trento and Bolzano) -all the schools in these areas would be considered as private.
• In the present paper, we just consider first-year students (a measure of flow), while OECD considers the stock of all the students enrolled in private schools.
• In OECD data, also courses for adults are counted for, and many of them are provided by private institutions. 
